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Michael LoCicero. A Midnight Massacre: The Night Operation on
the Passchendaele Ridge, 2 December 1917: The Forgotten Last Act
of the Third Battle of Ypres. Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, 2014.
Pp. 517.
It may come as a surprise to many readers that the Canadian attack
at Passchendaele on 10 November 1917 was not the culmination of
the long lamentable Third Ypres campaign. Nor did the 1st Division
gain “complete observation over the German positions to the northeast” on the ridge.1 Instead, as Michael LoCicero’s Midnight Massacre
describes, there was one further attempt by the British to seize the
remaining high points on the ridge on the night of 1/2 December
1917. Overshadowed by the far more momentous Battle of Cambrai,
this engagement did not merit a battle honour and fell outside the
official dates of Third Ypres. Carried out by one brigade each of the
8th and 32nd Divisions for a total of seven battalions, the attack
featured a night assault without a rolling barrage for its first eight
minutes to surprise the defenders. Despite the undoubted courage of
the troops, the attack was, as one battalion commander called it, a
“bad show” (p. xxvii). LoCicero has the ambitious aim of providing
an “in-depth account with a considered attempt to mesh the detailed
narrative with rigorous academic inquiry” (p. xxix). By limiting the
bounds of time and space of his study, he delves into a level of detail
that campaign accounts or unit narratives cannot investigate. As a
result, he covers the battle procedure and execution from the highest
command levels to the actions of individual platoons. The book is
the result of a ten-year research project into the battle and is based
on his PhD dissertation from the University of Birmingham. The
work is solidly situated in the revisionist school that has moved
beyond the ‘bloody fools’ view, and assesses the situation based on
the evidence instead of emotion. The result is a unique study which
is exhaustively researched, lavishly illustrated, and extensively
footnoted. It is a dense work that will appeal to academics and those
interested in the mechanics of how the British planned and carried
out operations.
The book seeks to answer two crucial research questions: why
another attack was necessary and was it more than just a futile effort.
1  
G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 325-6.
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The author casts a wide net in his research efforts. He consulted a
broad variety of official documents, personal diaries and letters of
participants at all levels, as well as the latest specialist academic
research. LoCicero also usefully includes the German perspective
from the Munich archives and regimental histories. This research is
apparent in the text and the extensive footnotes on each page, which
saves the reader from having to hunt down references at the back
of the book. He makes good use of field messages to help the reader
recognise both what the commanders understood the situation to be
and how it actually was. This helps in comprehending the reasoning
behind decisions. He also takes the time to sketch the background,
character, and circumstances of the participants at all levels and how
these impacted the operation.
The book comprises six chapters, twenty-one appendices, and
thirty-five pages of introductory material. Chapter One introduces
the battle’s background, its conception, the defenders, and
commanders. The next goes into depth into the formal operational
orders issued by the two corps involved and by each level down
to the battalions. Chapter Three describes what transpired on the
night of 1/2 December and the relative success and failure of the
units. Continuing discussion of the battle, the fourth chapter presents
the ongoing action during the daylight hours of 2 December as the
British commanders tried to understand what occurred and possibly
redeem the failures. The penultimate chapter narrates and analyses
the German reaction to the attack, the decision to shut down further
operations, and how the participants analysed the outcome and
derived lessons. The final chapter reviews the operational, strategic,
and political consequences of the battle, its costs, and its memory.
Appendices cover the operational orders issued by all levels of
command, the order of battle, and published German accounts of
the battle and other aspects of the action. Numerous illustrations of
the ground, terrain, conditions, people mentioned in the text, and
contemporary British and German trench maps enliven and inform
the text. The extensive quotations from orders that would have been
better suited to notes or an appendix result in a stylistic issue. They
tend to bog down the narrative and make the text less accessible to
the casual reader.
LoCicero describes the reason for the plan as stemming from
the twin motives of lessening the major risks of holding a narrow
salient and improving the starting point for a renewed offensive in
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the spring.2 At its heart, the book examines how the commanders
tried to square the circle of attacking out of a narrow salient with
an unfavourable artillery situation. A further complication was that
the attack occurred at the boundary between two divisions from
separate corps, both at the end of a shaky line of communications.
The driving force in the attack’s concept was the commander of the
32nd Division, Major-General C.D. Shute, who had to find a solution
to two critical issues. First, owing to the unfavourable field conditions,
his supporting artillery had to be deployed parallel to the axis of
advance rather than the usual perpendicular arrangement. This
made firing an accurate barrage across the attack front exceedingly
difficult. Second, the attackers had to cross no-man’s-land before
the German counter barrage came crashing down. In the glutinous
mud, the troops would move too slowly and so be subject to heavy
German shelling. Shute’s solution, imposed on the 8th Division, was
to forgo the standard rolling barrage for the first eight minutes in
a night moonlight attack. This would allow assault troops time to
capture the German forward zone and escape the counter barrage.
He thought moonlight was necessary to allow troops to assemble
correctly and advance in the proper direction. The threat of shelling
concerned him more than the risk of rifle and machine gun fire. As
LoCicero describes, he was wrong. It would be easy to paint a picture
of Shute as a British ‘Donkey,’ but the author has taken the time to
explain his motivations, the constraints that shaped his plan, and
how the travails of communications limited the exercise of command.
The author also highlights the challenges that exist when attacks
occur at formation boundaries, and how the importance of the main
effort negated the common-sense objections of experienced officers.
Recognising that, by 1917, British attacks were the combination of
multiple arms, LoCicero covers the vital aspects of logistics, medical
care, communications, artillery, and machine guns, and their effect
on the battle. Given Shute’s fretting about artillery, the one major
complaint about the book is that LoCicero should have provided more
context on the situation of both the British and German guns and
how the British lost artillery superiority.
The battle turned out as some commanders expected, with the
German infantry responding quickly to the attack and their rifle
and machine gun fire inflicting losses and disorganisation. British
The British Expeditionary Force had not yet shifted to a purely defensive posture.

2  
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attackers reached their first objectives but at the cost of serious
disorder and the loss of many of their crucial leaders, such that
they were ripe for a counterattack. The recapture of a key pillbox
hours before the attack at the junction of the 8th and 32nd Divisions
disrupted both formations’ assault and added to the confusion and
misunderstandings. In the end, the British made only a minor advance
and did not improve their position on the ridge.
The author achieves his goal of delivering a full appreciation of
an operation, its execution and its consequences from the highest
command levels down to individuals. It provides the reader with a
comprehensive understanding of the British art of war on the Western
Front circa December 1917. The work shows battle procedures, the
execution of a plan, and the outcomes of a small operation that, while
not noteworthy in the overall scale of the war, illustrates the British
art of war and how it had evolved by December 1917. The small scope
allows both reader and writer to understand a complex but tightly
constrained situation that is illustrative of the larger picture.
william f . stewart , independent researcher
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